By
Cyril Crawford
OSB
MT 102
Sr. Elizabeth
Willems SSND
19 November,
2003
The renewal of moral theology after the Second Vatican Council has been awe-inspiring. From a science of details that was almost “complete,” it has become a theological endeavor that speaks of our relationship to God, an existential dialogue that we live. One of the major figures in this transition is Bernard Häring. He wrote scholarly work and did international teaching and pastoral work for years, both before and after the Council. In all this time, however, he largely avoided the radicalism that characterized many post-Vatican II moral theology. This paper will present some of the distinctive themes of Häring’s thought, contrast it with the earlier manualist legalism and antinomian ‘situation ethics’, and offer a brief evaluation of his thought in terms of themes discussed in this class.
The Law of Christ (1959) was immediately recognized as significant and was translated from German into several languages. A particularly apt description of this work, and of Häring’s work in general, is given by a prominent student of his, Charles Curran: “Häring, like the [Second Vatican] Council, represents a beginning and not an end. The Law of Christ, his three volume magnum opus of moral theology, is definitely transitional in character.”[1] Foreshadowing many of the themes of the Council, the work is personalist and relational in its approach; yet it is structured according to traditional manuals of moral theology. It can seem a very strange mixture in retrospect.[2] Free and Faithful in Christ (1978) was written in English, after many years of international teaching. In it, Häring acknowledges the influence of the Council upon his thought; and he tries, without “disowning” his earlier effort, once again to consider moral theology comprehensively.[3] In the latter half of his life, Häring turned more and more to teaching and pastoral work, and away from scholarship.[4]
When we consider the major influences upon Häring, he himself is explicit about the impact of his own experiences in World War II: “what most influenced my thinking…was the mindless and criminal obedience of Christians to Hitler, a madman and a tyrant.”[5] Besides the perennial influences of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Alphonsus Liguori, there were the German theologians John Michael Sailer (1751-1832) and John Baptist Hirscher (1788-1865).[6] Both of these worked to distance moral theology from legalism and rationalism. Francis Xavier Linsenmann (1835-1898), of the “dynamic” Tübingen school, continued their work, emphasizing Pauline themes in moral theology.[7] The German Wertphilosophie (Value-philosophy) was another influence. The Value-philosophers included Dietrich von Hildebrand and Nicolai Hartmann, but the most influential upon Häring was Max Scheler, who most explicitly associates value with Person.[8] Phenomenological method and the derivative Existentialism (especially Martin Buber) were also important.[9]
We now begin an exposition of the most important systematic elements in Häring’s work. Häring’s work ranges over time and shows a development in his thought; to show this progress in any single point would itself require ten pages. Therefore, we must be content to sketch the general direction of his thought throughout his life, and we must attend to those areas that seem most distinctive of his work.
The most consistent description Häring has used for his philosophy is Christian personalism. Jonsen describes it as a “‘Personalistic-Value doctrine’” instead of the scholastic “‘Nature-Finality’ [sic] doctrine.”[10] For Häring, who is building upon insights of Wertphilosophie, values are the prerequisites of all norms; a norm is not a mere arbitrary restriction, but a call to realize a value.[11] There are the basic values, or persons; moral values, or the qualities of persons that promote relationships of love; and objective values, which are circumstances which contribute to the realization of the person.[12] In Häring’s modus operandi, “the person has primacy over all that is impersonal, and all that is impersonal (including moral laws) must be in the service of the person. Moral principles and norms are mediations of love and are therefore secondary.”[13] Even with regard to conscience, the personalist cannot be formed “merely or chiefly by looking to abstract principles.”[14]
The primary consequence of this methodology will be in the intimate connection of religion with morality: to understand Christian morality, we must understand the heart of religion. “Religion truly lived,” says Häring, “must have as essential characteristic the element of response.”[15] The very essence of religion is “the point of encounter between the word of God and the response of man.”[16] This response is at the heart of both Old and New Testaments.[17] Since religion is response, all religious ethics must be responsive or dialogical.[18] One’s moral life is “nourished entirely and utterly on the religious relation to God”; religion is “the very spirit” of morality, and the latter is “imbued with” and “centered” in the religious.[19] Thus “Christocentric moral Theology” synthesizes “theocentrism with Christian anthropocentrism.”[20]
In contrast to this, non-religious ethics is centered entirely on human nature and is monological. Christian religion can be reduced neither to focusing upon humanity, as does eudaemonism and individual meliorism, nor to concentrating exclusively upon the transcendence of God, as does deism.[21] These ethical systems either turn humanity’s attention back upon itself, away from the relation with God, or consider that relation “primarily from the standpoint of profit.”[22] Philosophical ethics like those of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant are described as “anthropocentric ethic[s] of self-perfection,”[23] which, though not entirely without value, always presents a danger to religious morality.[24] Even “Indian pantheism” and Nirvana center upon self-salvation.[25] One might say that these non-religious ethical systems consider humanity as looking down in dominion over the natural world, and this dominion is characterized by solitude. Religious morality, on the contrary, looks up toward God in communion and fellowship. Because “ultimately morality and religion must have the same center: community and fellowship with God,” these non-religious ethical systems ought to be means to communion with God, not ends in themselves.[26]
Häring has a different understanding of such basic concepts as ‘commandment’ and ‘law’ than do such ethical philosophies. He finds ‘commandment,’ as well as ‘law’ used within a moral context, to be essentially religious concepts. Each is an “appeal and invitation, altogether personal and addressed to every man.”[27] At times, an “ethic of [right] interior disposition,” such as Kant’s theory of moral value, can be stressed to the exclusion of an “ethic of commandment” or “ethic of law,” which ensures that what we do is “right and good in itself.”[28] At the same time, Kantian rationalism and deontologism make law “an abstract absolute,” not a call that “affect[s] the individual in each instance.”[29] Conscience is reduced to a “logical function.”[30] Häring does not deny the existence of universal laws, as would a Nominalist, for this creates different problems. He does deny, however, that such abstract laws are in se morality. Redemption and the moral life of the redeemed are an entering into dialogue with God; no monological form will suffice.[31] Thus the “Law of Christ”[32] is a covenant morality.[33] For the Christian, commandment and law “cease to be mere impersonal forces intervening between God and the soul. They are the living words of Christ addressed to us….Such a standard obviously is far higher than the minimal requirement of the Law of Sinai and infinitely above the standard of the natural law.”[34]
We now turn to responsibility, which Häring describes as “the focal center of Catholic moral teaching.”[35] He defines responsibility as “the relation of dialogue, word, and response, in a community.”[36] For Häring, “responsibility means that in a community between man and God, man responds to God’s word with…his decision and action.”[37] It is both “answering a call,” as well as “assuming liability” for moral choices.[38] Responsibility is what allows us to make all decisions, “indeed, all of our conscious life, a response to God….”[39]
At this point, Häring discriminates between religion as such, and the religious aspect of morality. The virtue of religion consists in our response to the Word of God, Christ, including “external acts” such as worship.[40] The moral virtues are concerned with the fulfillment of created order, with created persons, goods and values.”[41] These “do not essentially…and never immediately or directly, look to God, respond to God”; they involve response only insofar as “they penetrate through created order to God.”[42] In this way, “moral life as responsibility” allows Häring to emphasize “the interpenetration and formation of the moral through the religious, while also distinguishing the two realms.”[43] What of the possibility of conflict between the religious good and the moral good? While there is a sense in which, as free agents, we must give precedence to our own salvation over that of others or the Kingdom generally, we should seek “not to subordinate, but rather coordinate” these goods in imitation of Christ.[44] Just as “personal perfection,” while not intrinsically bad, is not the end of discipleship; so “the supernatural ideal of personal salvation” should not become “a mere means to save [the] soul.”[45] Christian morality is neither purely anthropocentric, nor is it purely theocentric, in the sense of utterly transcendent: it is Christocentric.[46]
We should not be surprised, then, that “all that is good and noble has its origin and goal in the person of Jesus Christ.”[47] The victory of Christ’s redemption was “achieved in his human nature through his total giving of self.”[48] He is “the perfect response.”[49] In reflecting on Christ’s life, Häring says, “we see the freshness and fullness of personal relationships,” and that with Christ “‘law’ never takes precedence over person.”[50] The Christian comes to see that “Christ, the head of redeemed mankind, is the perfect personality, the one who has fully preserved identity, uniqueness, and full self-respect in self-surrender.”[51] Christ brings both aspects together. “Jesus’ own kind of personalism, his being-a-person, his ‘being-with’,” must be understood in terms of the paschal mystery. In Christ, personhood and responsibility are perfectly united and realized.
Several important theological sources have come to be seen as distinctive to Häring’s approach to moral theology. The first is Scripture. Kathleen Calahan credits Häring with “the integration of Scripture into a discipline that was once nearly devoid of biblical images, let alone built upon biblical images or ideas.”[52] Johannine and Pauline images, especially concerning rebirth, imitation, and freedom, predominate in his work.[53] “The ‘vision’ he develops from biblical materials shapes his ethics--its underlying anthropology, its focus on character, its norms and criteria, and its process of moral deliberation. The scriptures are the determinative influence for Haring….”[54] Since “moral life is…the full response to God’s initiative,” we would also expect that Liturgy and the Sacraments would be important to Christian morality for Häring; and so they are.[55] Charles Curran, in describing Häring’s major themes, observes that “liturgy, especially the sacramental encounter, exemplifies in itself the dialogical character of the Christian life.”[56] This connection of liturgy and life is common in Häring.[57] All sacraments should be seen in terms of the fundamental option of our lives, says Häring.[58]
Finally, from dogmatic theology, the scholastic term relatio subsistens, used to define the personhood within the Trinity, implies for Häring that “the Divine Persons are not separated entities, not isolationists. They can be thought of by us only as ‘being-with’, life and love in action. The relationship in love and truth is the fullness of being-a-person.”[59] His emphasis upon community in the form of I-Thou-We is clearly Trinitarian; we cannot enter into relation with God, without also entering into relation with other people.
Of all the important applications of Häring’s discussion of freedom, the most important is fundamental option. Although Häring does not yet use the term ‘fundamental option’ in The Law of Christ, his discussion of motive and freedom already reveals its presence. The important point, he says, is not “whether the external act flows freely from the inner source,” but whether or not this inner source is itself “pre-determined by the free will”; once it is , i.e., an “ultimate and decisive goal of life” is determined, then the motives fall into place without any compromise of free will.[60] By the time of Free and Faithful in Christ, Häring is explicitly using the roughly synonymous terms ‘fundamental option’ and ‘basic decision’. The term ‘fundamental option’ he takes from its use by Joseph Fuchs and Karl Rahner.[61] Häring gives as a minimal definition “the activation of a deep knowledge of self and of basic freedom by which a person commits himself.”[62] This commitment may be either for good or evil.
A good fundamental option is a sine qua non of true morality.[63] It reveals the power and profundity of our freedom, in that freedom goes beyond particular decisions and into who we are and will be.[64] The fundamental option is “never affirmed, weakened, or changed” except in terms of covenant and relation to others.[65] In addition to proper relationship with God, Häring also makes explicit some of the basic options which, “in spite of their pious appearance, can in reality be abortive choices.”[66] Among these is a fixation on “individual salvation” that never rises to “self-transcendence.”[67] Also mentioned are misguided attachments to static understandings of the relationship to God, such as external motivations toward security or immature understandings of freedom. All of these fail to understand the dynamic nature of Christianity and its call to ‘constant conversion’.[68] Mortal sin, within this understanding of freedom, is a fundamental option for evil; moreover, this can be sudden and “clear-sighted,” or gradual and cumulative, though always involving some decision.[69]
A concept of which Häring speaks often is the principle of epikeia, or the possibility of exception to positive law when the letter is in conflict with the spirit of the law. It has been a controversial topic, for it places the responsibility for this decision on the individual conscience.[70] Epikeia is discussed by Thomas Aquinas, who considers it a virtue; in his view, it is always an appeal to a higher principle, and never an excuse to avoid obligations.[71] Significantly, Häring says that epikeia is not properly applied to natural law, which is an unformulated law ever applied to new circumstances.[72]
No discussion of Häring’s moral theology can avoid his emphasis on the individual and community. For Häring, the individual is no mere instantiation of the universal, but “a unique and singular existence given by the creative will of God,” an “individual moral self” with “individual potentialities” to be realized.[73] This realization, however, can only take place with the support of the community.[74] Individuality that has become present to itself (while facilitated by community) is personality.[75] Finally, community is a “loving solidarity” and identification together.[76] It is a ‘We’ to accompany the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ of individuality and interpersonal encounter. The ‘I-Thou-We’ (Martin Buber’s famous ‘word’ with a communitarian dimension) is a fundamental moral structure for Häring. Distinct from the impersonal mass and utilitarian organization, community is more than multiple Thou’s. It has its own “nature and distinctive ethos,”[77] and its most important characteristics are “co-humanity” and “mutual fidelity.”[78] In contrast to community, the conflict of selfish individuals and “self-centered organizations” produces a “defense morality,’ where individual and collective rights clash.[79] Moral support is mutual between the community and individuals, even those morally advanced.[80] Häring extends the nature of the “I-Thou-We” relationship beyond such fundamental relations as family and friends; “impersonal structures” in society at large have adverse moral effects.[81]
The supreme example of the interaction between personality and community is in the Mystical Body of Christ.[82]
Now that an outline of Häring’s systematic thought has been given, we will turn to how his thought is situated between two equally unacceptable extremes: legalistic rigorism and radical situation ethics. The first extreme from which Häring distanced his thought was the manualist tradition, which developed moral theology by the juridical methods of canon law. Legalism does not ‘distinguish between the different sources of morality---namely, man’s innermost being and calling, the needs of persons in their growth toward greater maturity, their historical position and social adjustment, and the signs of the times.”[83] As Albert Jonsen put Häring’s objection, “The moral life does not simply effect fellowship with God; it springs from fellowship with him.”[84] Both the methodology that gives pride of place to abstraction, as well as the concentration on the extremes and frontiers of morality, rather than its central issues, make this approach objectionable to Häring.
Furthermore, the manualist tradition is loath to recognize the supernatural in the moral life. Grace, in their explanations, has “no immediate empirical effect” on the natural life, either in form or content; and obedience is the term in which all moral life is described.[85] For Häring, however, grace is seen through the natural life, not on top of it; moral life is relationship expressed and realized through law.[86] The order of values derives from our relations as person, not from the “nature of things.”[87] Thus “every moral principle must justify itself in its capacity to express the basic reality of love.”[88]
Häring, sensitive to the German experience under Hitler, not only recognizes a moral culpability from direct participation in evil, but also from negligence and “uncreative use of our freedom.” He notes that many evils in society and Church” are caused by “a legalistic morality that stifles the positive energies of liberty.”[89] This would only draw stares of disbelief from manualists.
The reliance on canon law methods distanced manualist moral theology from both Scripture and Liturgy, in fact, from all other theology. Häring explicitly identifies the “‘normative ethics’” understanding of Christian moral theology, which has little dependence upon the “dynamic dimensions and perspectives which we find in the Bible,” with the manualist tradition.[90] Likewise, the Liturgical renewal, which had made clearer the supremacy of grace and the “dialogical character of Christian life” (supremely true in the sacraments), had little significance for an abstract moral calculus.[91] The People of God, says Häring, can even learn something about the structure of Christian morality from liturgical structure. But when formalism prevails in the latter, it will almost certainly prevail in the former.[92]
The other extreme which Häring strives to avoid is that of radical situation ethics. Representatives of this method include Joseph Fletcher, J.A.T. Robinson,[93] and Ernst Michel.[94] The causes of this overreaction are found, partly in individualism,[95] but also in a rigorism that fails “to make clear-cut distinctions between immutable and changeable positive laws.”[96] Both legalists and “extreme situationists,” though seemingly so different in details, “are concerned not with the unique person-who-acts but with the act in abstraction.”[97] This results in “fixed, mechanistic applications that do not respect the variety and development manifested in God’s creative design.”[98] While the former subordinates the person to an “abstract moral code,” the rejection of all moral absolutes by situation ethics distorts the character of that love whose realization is the fulfillment of morality.[99] The legalist’s ‘situationism’ regards a ‘legal situation’ without regard for the demands of “God’s law of love”; the other extreme’s ‘situationism’ can make room for a supposed case of love which may turn out in fact to be utilitarian or selfish in motive. Both moral methods put the abstract ‘situation’ before persons.[100] Häring concedes that, because morality is a response of a person in a particular situation, “all morality is situational”; he is quick to qualify this, however, by recalling that there is an “essential character of love” that must be progressively understood more completely, not “neglected or misrepresented.”[101]
Nevertheless, we must wonder: how can someone as emphatic about liberty disagree with the radical liberty of situation ethics? It is because
a distinctively Christian ethics of responsibility entails as much creative fidelity as creative liberty. We give particular attention to this in view of an existentialism that is so obsessed with self-affirmation that it loses the sense of continuity and commitment. Where there is arbitrariness and total discontinuity, there is neither responsibility nor creativity. As soon as one loses a sense of history, he also loses a sense of commitment, and all the new creations of self-affirmation fall into the abyss of nothingness.[102]
Situation ethics, says Häring, is apt to fall into the “defense morality” of individual rights in conflict with collective rights that can attend ethics of self-perfection.[103]
When Häring describes his own approach as “teleology without, however, excluding all kinds of deontology,”[104] he emphasizes the priority of relationship before abstract norms. Christian responsibility is contradicted by “an unprincipled ethics of an unstructured ‘love’ as, for instance, that of Joseph Fletcher.”[105] Teleology, for Häring, need not mean “the utilitarian consequentialism of a naïve and unintelligent situation ethics. Priority is always given to the telos, the inner calling of the person….”[106] Häring sees at work here a false dilemma:
as Christians, we should give our greatest attention to forming a harmonious synthesis of deontological and teleological reflections. We cannot accept an ‘either/or’ approach: either deontological rules or attention only to results.[107]
This desire for balance is at the heart of Häring’s method.
Finally, we must offer some attempt at evaluation of Häring’s thought. Overall, I found Häring’s work very appealing and balanced. I find Häring’s personalism very attractive; I always find existential themes and the phenomenology of the Person, and even metaphysical themes that recognize the prominence of Personhood, more adequate to the world than systems that erect a hierarchy of things over persons. Without Person, there can be no Mystery; and this will always degenerate into domination, rather than dialogue. Related to this, I appreciate how Häring finds Person revealed through act, in a way that recalls virtue ethics; these approaches have much in common.[108] The role of The Law of Christ in provoking questions and overcoming manualist distortions of moral theology is great and admirable. Furthermore, I admire Häring as a teacher for being both influential upon Vatican II and being influenced in turn. Again, while Bernard Häring never presented his teaching as specifically derived from Patristic influences, his emphasis on Jesus as the Ultimate and Proximate moral Norm; his return to Scripture for a context for moral norms; and his immediate connection of Liturgy, the Sacraments, and morality in their common source and interaction, is Patristic in origin and very admirable.
While I appreciate Häring’s understanding of the nature-grace relationship, as well as the intrinsic significance it gives to Christian life for morality (should Jesus be a mere appendix to morality?), this does tend toward a faith-ethic position that can present problems for ecumenical dialogue. [109] This has long been a tension in Christianity: how can morality be rational, without being extrinsic? Usually, the answer has been: because Christ makes explicit what was implicit before he was revealed. Does this solve everything? Likewise, I very much agree with a bottom line approach to Christian orientation. Basic option moral reasoning is existentialist in the best sense, and it emphasizes the Rahnerian theme (?!) of the presence of freedom and faith in non-categorical ways. This fundamental option, along with the nature-grace position above, comes close to Rahner’s “supernatural existential,” the transcendental structure of all human existence that calls us to be in relation with God, to the point of assuring that we are, by our very natures, in some relation to and with God.
I think Häring’s argument that we need not choose between deontological legalism and teleological nominalism is very convincing in his discussions. Odozor’s description of “good casuistry” may be made of moral theology generally: it is “neither a legalistic scheme nor a reckless antinomianism.”[110] Whether he always achieved such balance in practice is another matter. The vehemence of his integralism and abhorrence of anthropological dualism I also admire. His general approach of the person before any “nature” is the best argument for this.
Buber’s I and Thou is a work I love dearly. I think his use of the expansion of I and Thou, to I-Thou-We, makes a wonderful connection in human community with the immanent Trinity. This approach, in some sense, “explains why” there are not only two persons in the Blessed Trinity.
On the other hand, I suspect that his moral system, though profound, tells us more about what it is that the moral person does than how to become the moral person in concrete details. The personalist approach is important, even necessary; but it is not sufficient. One can easily imagine two directors, not in communication, advising the same person, and giving very, very different messages to the directee. How one sees the moral relationship will be so supreme as to lead to subjectivism in extreme cases.
Häring’s
discussion of natural law, as we might expect, is underdeveloped; he neither
ignores nor develops it, but merely repeats and avoids extremes. When he does discuss natural law, it seems
entirely the “law of reason,” rather than the “law of nature.” Such disdain (even more extreme in students
of his, such as Charles Curran) for all “law of nature” reasoning as
“physicalism” contains the danger of unleashing an unrealistic spiritualism
that neglects the physiological realities of human life for “higher”
personalist concerns.[111]
Furthermore, I can imagine a readiness to appeal to epikeia leading to confusions. Professor William E. May, in an article for L’Osservatore Romano, has discussed some of the practical problems that can result from such a subjective application of this principle.[112] Christ surely gave priority to spirit over letter, and all acknowledge some such principle; but the problem is in the details of when to apply this principle. Ironically, we tend to follow the letter of epikeia, more than its spirit. In my opinion, a comparison might be made here with the phenomenon of ecstatic levitation: I do not deny that it happens, yet we need not encourage each other to levitate. Should the Spirit so move, any directions or justifications about this to each other will be bogus.
Charles Curran notes his doubts that moral theologians of the future will refer to Häring’s system or analyses of moral themes. Nevertheless, he thinks that Häring has been of great influence in moral theology.[113] I find Curran’s dismissive attitude toward Häring strange, not only in light of Curran’s proclaimed debt to Häring,[114] but also in light of the return to the thought of groundbreaking predecessors that always precedes renewal. I think Häring’s example of academic and pastoral work, achieved in fidelity that was not without its share of disagreement, is admirable. I also think that his influence of personalism will last longer than more radical theories derived from it. In short, I am a good deal more optimistic about the degree and duration of Bernard Häring’s significance in moral theology.
Works Cited
Calahan, Kathleen A. “‘Still Spiritually Alive’: Remembering Bernard Häring.” America, 15 August 1998, 10-14.
Curran, Charles E. A New Look at Christian Morality. Christian Morality Today, vol. 2. Notre Dame, IN: Fides Publishers, 1968.
Hamel, Ron P. “On Bernard Haring: constructing medical ethics theologically.” Second Opinion 17, no.2 (Oct 1991). Available [Online]:<http://web5.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/>
Select: General
Reference Center Gold/ article A11474674 [17 November
2003].
Häring, Bernard. Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity. vol. 1, General Moral Theology. New York: Seabury Press, 1978.
--------. “The Importance of Liturgical Renewal for Moral Theology.” In Toward a Christian Moral Theology.The Cardinal O’Hara Series: Studies and Research in Christian Theology at Notre Dame, vol. 2. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
--------. “The Law of Christ and the Many Laws.” In Toward a Christian Moral Theology.The Cardinal O’Hara Series: Studies and Research in Christian Theology at Notre Dame, vol. 2. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
--------. The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity. Trans. Edwin G. Kaiser. Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1961.
--------. Morality is for Persons. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971.
Jonsen,Albert R. Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics. Washington, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968.
May, William E. “The Opinions of Fr. Bernard Häring C.SS.R. on Ministry to the Divorced and Remarried.” L’Osservatore Romano [English], 11 March 1991, 2.
Odozor, Paulinus Ikechukwu. Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study of the Catholic Tradition Since Vatican II. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
[1] Charles Curran, A New Look at Christian Morality, Christian Morality Today, vol. 2 (Notre Dame, IN: Fides Publishers, 1968), 146.
[2]
Ibid.
[3] Bernard Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity, vol.1, General Moral Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), 1.
[4] Curran, 148.
[5] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 2.
[6] Bernard Häring, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1961), 23-5.
[7] Law of Christ, 28.
[8] Albert R. Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics, (Washington, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968), 94.
[9] Häring, Law of Christ, 195 et passim.
[10] Jonsen, 92.
[11] Häring, Law of Christ, 227.
[12] Jonsen, 96.
[13]
Ron P. Hamel, “On Bernard Haring: Constructing Medical Ethics Theologically,” Second
Opinion 17, no.2 (Oct 1991), Available
[Online]:<http://web5.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/> Select:
General Reference Center Gold/ article A11474674
[17 November 2003].
[14] Häring, Morality is for Persons, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971), 22.
[15] Häring, Law of Christ, 35.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 15.
[18] Häring, Law of Christ, 35.
[19] Ibid., 38.
[20] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 5.
[21] Häring, Law of Christ, 35.
[22] Ibid., 41.
[23] Ibid., 39.
[24] Ibid., 41.
[25] Ibid., 40.
[26] Häring, Law of Christ, 41.
[27] Ibid., 42.
[28] Ibid., 43.
[29] Ibid., 44.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., 45.
[32] Gal 6.2. All biblical citations in this paper will be from the NRSV.
[33] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 17.
[34] Häring, Law of Christ, 52.
[35] Häring, Law of Christ, 45-6.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 46.
[38] Ibid., 47.
[39] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 65.
[40] Häring, Law of Christ, 46.
[41] Ibid., 47.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., 49.
[45] Ibid., 52.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Bernard Häring, “The Law of Christ and the Many Laws,” in Toward a Christian Moral Theology, The Cardinal O’Hara Series: Studies and Research in Christian Theology at Notre Dame, vol. 2. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 194.
[48] Häring, Morality, 40.
[49] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 20.
[50] Häring, Morality, 33.
[51] Ibid., 58.
[52] Kathleen Calahan, “Still Spiritually Alive: Remembering Bernard Häring,” America, 15 August 1998, 10.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Hamel, “On Bernard Haring,”
[55] Calahan, “Still Spiritually Alive: Remembering Bernard Häring,” 11.
[56] Curran, 149.
[57] Ibid., 148.
[58] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 192.
[59] Häring, Morality, 35.
[60] Häring, Law of Christ, 104.
[61] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 166.
[62] Ibid., 168.
[63] Ibid., 186.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid., 190.
[66] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 208.
[67] Ibid., 209.
[68] Ibid., 210.
[69] Ibid., 212-3.
[70] Curran, 154.
[71] Ibid., 138.
[72] Häring, Law of Christ, 247.
[73] Häring, Law of Christ, 74.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., 75-6.
[76] Ibid., 78.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 79.
[79] Ibid., 76.
[80] Ibid., 79.
[81] Häring, Morality, 83.
[82] Häring, Law of Christ, 80.
[83] Häring, Morality, 117.
[84] Jonsen, 90-91.
[85] Ibid., 104-5.
[86] Ibid., 105.
[87] Ibid., 98.
[88] Häring, Morality, 128.
[89] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 81-2.
[90] Ibid., 23.
[91] Bernard Häring, “The Importance of Liturgical Renewal for Moral Theology,” in Toward a Christian Moral Theology, The Cardinal O’Hara Series: Studies and Research in Christian Theology at Notre Dame, vol. 2. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 81-3.
[92] Ibid., 85.
[93] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 358.
[94] Häring, “The Law of Christ and the Many Laws,” 207.
[95] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 359.
[96] Häring, “The Law of Christ and the Many Laws,” 206.
[97] Häring, Morality, 127.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid., 134-5.
[100] Ibid., 133.
[101] Ibid., 128.
[102] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 74.
[103] Häring, “The Law of Christ and the Many Laws,” 209.
[104] Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, 83.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid., 342.
[108] Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study of the Catholic Tradition Since Vatican II. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 248-9.
[109] Ibid., 123.
[110] Odozor, Moral Theology, 263.
[111] Ibid., 177-78.
[112] William E. May, “The Opinions of Fr. Bernard Häring C.SS.R. on Ministry to the Divorced and Remarried,” L’Osservatore Romano, [English], 11 March 1991, 2.
[113] Curran, 157.
[114] Ibid.